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Abstract 
The authors discuss the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), an instrument used in many types of networks, including EtherNet 
and DeviceNet. The CIP is classified into a large number of variants, for example CIP Safety, CIP Sync, or CIP Energy, to 
facilitate easy communication between industrial network components that need to interact with other elements in the given 
network. Out of these categories, CIP Safety will be described in greater detail, with a particular focus on the principles and 
applications of this version of the protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
The meaning and purpose of safety are well known, and all people active in industry should be aware of their 
functional interpretation. The term functional safety covers the overall safety of machines [5], which can be 
achieved through various means, including fixed or movable guards, electronic, electromechanical or other machine-
controlling hardware or applications, and information-related measures that generally help us to decrease the level of 
risk in machines and processes. The safety-oriented category [1] of the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) [2, 4] is 
widely used for instances and fields (such as machinery) where a high degree of Safety Integrity Level is needed. 
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The introductory section of this paper comprises an outline of CIP-based network communication, and this part 
is suitably connected with the actual core of the article, namely the problem of extending the CIP to facilitate the 
transmission of safety information (CIP Safety [3, 7]). In this context, the authors specify the basic properties and 
capabilities necessary for the system to be regarded as safe. The final portion of the analysis contains error 
probability calculation to compare two different types of the emergency stop circuit design: the solution using the 
traditional relay-based technology, and the approach with a distributed system on a bus, in which communication via 
the CIP Safety protocol is utilised. 
2. Common Industrial Protocol 
The Common Industrial Protocol was designed by the ODVA organization. In general terms, the CIP [2, 4] 
describes connected or unconnected communication. The latter concept denotes communication for hardware which 
is not capable of building a data package for CIP messages. In controllers, MSG instruction is applied to enable 
usage on demand. Conversely, the former type of communication is needed for all devices located in the same 
network and intending to cooperate with each other seamlessly. Controllers use connection for the point-to-point 
communication path between the source and the destination. If we allude, for example, to the architecture of 
ControlLogix, then we have to point out that the processor opens the connection to every input, output, 
communication, or any other card in system; moreover, access is provided in this manner to the communication card 
or, through this card, to decentralized inputs, outputs, visualization, and all other devices. Every processor has a 
number of connections which can be opened at a single moment. While the smallest CPU can hold 8 connections, 
the best processors are capable of supporting up to 500 connections. This is physically represented by some allocated 
memory, communication time, and resources which have to be reserved on both sides.  
Class 1 connections can send and receive data repeatedly at a pre-determined and configured rate. The discussed 
parameter is referred to as the RPI (Request Packet Interval), and it is always an attribute of definition of this 
connection. The connection is opened for the entire time during which the network remains operative and the 
originator is alive. When the target or the originator drop the link, the connection is closed and periodically retried 
by the originator.  
Class 3 connections can be closed by the originator or via timeout; this form of communication is widely used in, 
for example, HMI interaction. 
CIP services are always active and use unconnected communication to open Class 1 or 3 connections; 
importantly, they do not require user intervention to initiate the link. Based on the specification, we need connection 
to exchange any data between the members in a network, and data exchange is also necessary to establish the 
connection. In a network, the UnConnected Message Manager is active, providing the necessary means to 
communicate without any established connection and allowing “one shot” requests without setting up the 
connection. The originator sends an UnConnected message to the target in order to establish a connection, and it has 
to know how to obtain the type of information required from the target. This information can be found in an 
Electronic Data Sheet file. 
3. CIP Safety 
CIP Safety (Fig. 1) is an extended version of CIP messaging. As it is an extension, any device which cannot 
decode CIP safety is not involved in the communication. Identical principles are used for CIP Sync [8] in 
performing time synchronization, for example with respect to motion control on the axes and CIP Energy in devices 
measuring power consumption and power network quality. 
CIP Safety [1, 3, 7] applies two basic principles of safety engineering practice: redundancy and diversity. CIP 
Safety uses only Class 1 connection. In any case of closed communication, all the outputs go to the safe state 
(logical 0). Every input/output card of the network has one connection, which means that the CPU ensures 99.9% 
diagnostics on every safety card regarding the events occurred and the measures to be adopted for higher SIL 
ratings. For non-safety IOs, the connection can be set as rack-optimized; thus, in an ideal case, sixty-three IO cards 
(each can have up to eight IOs) can be communicated over one connection. In safety connection, we can set the 
Safety Network Number; this is a unique code set up in the course of the programming phase, and it is combined 
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with the node’s IP address to get the UNID (Unique Node ID) used for clear identification of the point for 
communication. The Safety Network Number is generated automatically, but it can be modified by the designer or 
programmer of the safety system.  
The second highly precise technique to be described utilizes time stamps in every data package of the connection. 
This method is referred to as the Connection Reaction Time Limit (CRTL), and it is available in two forms: the 
CRTL of the inputs and outputs, both observable from the CPU. The number of inputs multiplied by the RPI value 
plus the latency of the network will yield the value of the CRTL for the inputs; in the output signal, the aspects 
considered comprise the Safety Task period and the latency of the network. 
The third technique to provide safety information between two members of a safety network is the CRC. 
 
 
Fig. 1. CIP Safety in the architecture of an ISO/OSI model [2]. 
4. Measures to render CIP Safety reliable 
Although it is generally known how to transport safety data between two devices, we also have to be sure that the 
data have been transported to the right device. For this purpose, we use the property of every safety-related device, 
namely the UNID (Unique Network Identifier). The UNID can be identified as a MAC address, but it can also be 
modified by the SW designer if necessary. The UNID is encoded and safe–checked in all safety connections. As 
regards EtherNet [6], the UNID stems from the combination of the SNN (Safety Network Number) and the IP 
address of a node in the network. Thanks to this feature, the safety architecture is not restricted to one IP address set 
in the device, and we can use, for example, DHCP or BootP servers to obtain the IP address. The UNID has to be set 
up manually during the development/maintenance phase by the system designer or supervisor, and setting up the 
UNID and the IP address is fully independent. 
Safety functions originated and were progressively developed in the 1980s and 1990s; at the time, this was the 
only method to produce safe applications. The actual evolution proceeded from hard-wired emergency stop buttons 
through switches and safety relays to contactors. Safety functions became very difficult to interconnect when more 
operational modes were available on one machine (such as a press), and therefore safety elements consumed a 
substantial part of the operating space of a machine. With the EN954-1 standard, there was also no other procedure 
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to handle safety functions than that constituted by electromechanical devices. However, as both technology and 
safety keep moving forward, special safety systems started to appear in the late 1990s, facilitating the connectability 
of all safety devices into a single system and enabling us to decide what safety functions could be materialized on a 
software basis in conjunction with relevant sensors. From the perspective of legislation, this was nevertheless 
possible only with difficulty because, according to relevant laws from the given period, at least one emergency stop 
device had to be an electromechanical apparatus. After new legal standards were adopted in 2002, safety PLCs 
became applicable without certification restrictions. 
Safety PLCs (usually with a redundant processor, networks, and other internal parts) are very effective even 
when other machine safety projects have to be adapted to the device in a complicated manner. But certain 
requirements for more complex functions surfaced too, including operation under safe speed or safe position of the 
proportional valves. Such demands can be satisfied only via microprocessor solutions as these applications are hard 
to solve by simple relays.  
When safety had become a major aspect for machine users and operators, it was to be soon followed by the 
distributed solution of safety. In Germany, the committee for safety fieldbuses was founded in 1989 with the aim to 
adapt safety requirements transported over networks in line with the basic bundle of safety standards – the IEC (later 
also EN) 61508. Among the outcomes of the work performed by this committee there is also the CIP Safety 
published by the ODVA on the basis of the CIP. 
4.1. Measures to keep CIP Safety reliable 
Before transporting safety information, we need to create a Safety Channel on the network. The Safety Channel 
consists of a Client and a Server; on each of these two members, some validator has to be present to confirm 
whether the information is safe and, more importantly, reliable. The Safety device can be a monitor, a controller, an 
input or output, and an input or output device (sensor or actuator). The controller and monitor communicate with the 
I/O devices through I/O modules. This set of devices is referred to as the Safety Chain. 
 
Table 1. Error detection measures [2]. 
Communication Errors Measures to Detect Communication Errors 
 
Time Expectation 
via Time Stamp 
ID for Send and 
Receive 
Safety CRC 
Redundancy with 
Cross Checking 
Diverse 
Measures 
Message Repetition X  X*   
Message Loss X  X*   
Message Insertion X X X*   
Incorrect Sequence X  X*   
Message Corrupt   X X  
Message Delay X     
Coupling of Safety and Safety Data  X    
Coupling of Safety and Standard Data X X X X X 
Increased Age of Data in Bridge X     
* The Safety CRC provides additional protection for communication errors in fragmented messages. 
 
Whenever the validator checks the reliability of a message (Table 1), it uses the sequence of the pinging source 
with CRC ending and evaluates the CRC time stamp, time stamp, CRC data, safety data, and CRC complement data. 
Furthermore, cross checking is also performed within this operation. When the connection is terminated, the 
application is informed of such termination to be able to execute interventions including the de-energetising of the 
outputs. The CRCs used for CIP safety purposes are CRC-S1 or S2; these versions contain two bytes, of which one 
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(8bit) byte is for the CRC safety data, and the other is for the time stamp. The 16bit CRC-S3 is used for the CRC of 
the safety basic data with lengths from 3 to 250 bytes. 
5. Comparison of the wired and network techniques  
Let us now compare the outlined approaches for the purpose of very simple statistical data calculation. In this 
context, let us build a model case with a safety gate including a monitoring electromechanical switch that comprises 
two contacts connected in wiring category 3. The output will contain two contactors with feedback loop monitoring. 
Generally, two different solutions are to be performed; while we use a safety module or a relay for the safety logic 
function in the first method, the second case will involve a safety system using EtherNet/IP. 
5.1. The safety relay approach 
Safety relay is an incorrect term for a device which should be regularly referred to as a safety module. Some time 
ago, this safety module consisted of several relays packed in one box; these relays were interconnected to resolve 
problems related to safety, diagnostics, resetting, and some other safety and non-safety functions using the NO and 
NC contacts of classical electro-magnetic relays. 
In order to evaluate the safety function, we have to define the concrete device for which the manufacturer 
provides statistical values of dangerous failures. Furthermore, it is necessary to determine the value following from 
the designer’s assumption of how often the safety function will be used; to illustrate this statement, we could refer 
again to the case where the value expresses simultaneously the frequency of a safety gate opening and the exclusion 
of a potentially hazardous situation. At this point, let us choose the simplest solution: the designer will include in the 
manual two elementary parameters, namely the number of switching cycles per twenty years and the probability of a 
dangerous failure per the same unit of time. 
 However, to evaluate the SIL CL (Safety Integrity Level Claim Limit), we need also other properties, and these 
are as follows: 
x Hardware Fault Tolerancy (HFT) 
x Probability of Dangerous Failure per Hour (PFHD) 
x Safety Fail Fraction (SFF) 
x Diagnostic Coverage 
x Architecture of System 
x Number of switching cycles per hour 
x Test Proof Interval (T1) 
x Diagnostic Test Interval (T2) 
x Number of dangerous cycles which is taken from EN ISO 13849-1 (B10d) 
Let us now suppose that our safety gate monitoring corresponds to the requirements stipulated by SIL2, which is 
included in the overview of significant risk assessment documents (Table 2). 
Table 2. Architectural constraints on subsystems: the maximum SIL that can be claimed for the safety- related control 
function using this subsystem (standard IEC 62061). 
Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT) (see Note 1) 
 0 1 2 
< 60% Not allowed SIL1 SIL2 
60% … < 90% SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 
90% … <99% SIL2 SIL3 SIL 3 (see Note 2) 
≥ 99% SIL3 SIL3 (see Note 2) SIL 3 (see Note 2) 
Note 1 A hardware fault tolerance of N means that N+1 faults could cause a loss of the safety-related control function. 
Note 2 A SIL 4 claim limit is not considered in this standard. For SIL 4 see IEC 61508-1. 
Note 3 Exception, see 6.7.7 in IEC 62061. 
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We intend to build a system respecting the provisions of the SIL2, and there are three possibilities of how to 
satisfy the given specifications. The first option is that we will structure a system comprising a triple channel 
(HFT = 2); in these circumstances, the Safe Failure Fraction rate can equal 60% or less. The second and most 
common alternative involves a dual channel (HFT = 1), where the reliability indicator ranges between 60 and 90% 
of the SFF. Finally, the last choice consists in a single channel (HFT = 0); here, however, it is necessary to reach 
more than 90% of the SFF.  
Which of these ways, then, is the easiest one? In response, we could definitely point to the first approach, yet 
such a solution would not be economical. For machinery safety, only a very limited number of components are 
connectable via the triple channel in the sensors part, and there is no safety module for the triple channel device; 
thus, the only method to resolve the problem is to use some type of the safety PLC, which can be adjusted by 
software. But the modification via software is no simple step either, because the prepared and certified blocks for the 
evaluation of safety functions are “only” dual channel. The last option (a single channel and SFF rate of 90 - 99%) 
cannot bring the desired benefit, as it simply requires too much diagnostics, thus necessitating the use of difficult 
systems to detect serious failures. The most advantageous and easy-to-connect procedure will be the middle option, 
namely a dual channel with a relatively low SFF indicator. 
Another step is to determine the architecture of entire subsystems. Our safety function consists of three 
subsystems: an electro-mechanical safety switch; a safety module evaluating signals from the sensor; and a pair of 
safety contactors controlling the power supply to the motor performing dangerous movements of the machine. 
Because we have HFT = 1, we will use the dual channel configuration. This brings us to the architectures of 
subsystems C or D; the difference between these two types lies in the Common Cause Failure rate (CCF). As it is 
essential to have a Common Cause Failure in both the electro-mechanical switch and the safety contactors, we need 
to use type D architecture. The CCF is well described in annex F of the IEC 62061 standard. To obtain positive 
evaluation, we have to adopt some measures to lower the CCF indicator. For every single measure, we will receive 
points to be summarized, and Tab. F.2 of the IEC 62061 standard contains the “beta factor” which will be needed 
later for our calculations. Even though it is necessary to admit that more fulfilled measures produce more points and 
a better beta-factor, we also have to note that such conditions result in increased expenditure on the project. Our 
previous experience nevertheless shows that a score of between 70 and 80 points is reachable with rather small 
investment and that the beta factor of 2% is low enough to fundamentally influence the PFHD value at the final 
stage. 
We have to calculate the failure rate for the electromechanical switch and also for the contactors according to 
formula D.1 from the IEC 62061 standard: 
 
ߣ஽ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߚሻଶ ή ቀ
൫ఒವభήఒವమήሺ஽஼భା஽஼భሻ൯ή మ்
ଶ ൅
൫ఒವభήఒವమήሺଶି஽஼భି஽஼భሻ൯ή భ்
ଶ ቁ ൅ ߚ ή ቀ
ఒವభାఒವమ
ଶ ቁ  (1) 
 
Further, we will calculate the failure rate of dangerous failures, namely  
 
ܲܨܪ஽ ൌ ߣ஽ ή ܪܨܶ ή ݄ (2) 
 
to finally obtain the PFHD. 
These calculations have to be performed for all elements of the inputs and outputs. 
If we use the safety electromechanical switch which exhibits B10D 106 cycles and the testing interval of 50 ms, the 
SFF rate will be 85%; we will thus obtain PFHDinputs = 1.5·10-7. 
We will use two contactors, each exhibiting B10D 2·107 cycles and the testing interval of 50 ms; the SFF indicator 
will then equal 85%, too. In this manner, we have PFHDoutputs = 6.2·10-9. 
For the safety module, the procedure is simple: we will follow the manufacturer data sheet, which informs us that 
in SIL 3 we obtain the formula expressed below PFHDoutputs = 1.2·10-8. 
Now, we can define the PFHDSafetyRelay for the complete safety function. According to article 6.6.3.2.3 of the IEC 
62061 standard, the complete PFHD will be calculated as the sum of all partial PFHDi values. For our situation, the 
equation will be as follows: 
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ܲܨܪ஽ௌ௔௙௘௧௬ோ௘௟௔௬ ൌ ܲܨܪ஽௜௡௣௨௧௦ ൅ ܲܨܪ஽௟௢௚௜௖ ൅ ܲܨܪ஽௢௨௧௣௨௧௦   (3) 
 
The complete result of the PFHDSafetyRelay is 1.682·10-7. With this outcome, we will proceed to Tab. 3 to find out 
that our result corresponds to SIL 2. 
Table 3. Safety integrity levels (IEC 62061). 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Probability of a dangerous Failure per Hour 
(PFHD) 
3 ≥ 10-8 to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
NOTE: Where the required safety integrity of a SRCF is less than SIL 1, the requirements of category B 
of ISO 13849-1 should be met as a minimum. 
 
5.2. Solution using safety PLC 
The major part of the evaluation will be identical with that outlined in the previous chapter. The inputs and 
contactors include all properties exhibited by the CCF, PFHD, SFF and other parameters; the novel part to be 
introduced in this section is the logical element. This time, five subsystems are included: the inputs representing the 
electromechanical switch; the distributed safety inputs connected over EtherNet/IP; the safety CPU; the distributed 
safety outputs connected over EtherNet/IP, too; and safety contactors functioning as actuators. 
The equation for the calculation will remain virtually unchanged; the only difference will consist in the overall 
PFHDSafetyPLC, as indicated below:   
 
ܲܨܪ஽ௌ௔௙௘௧௬௉௅஼ ൌ ܲܨܪ஽௜௡௣௨௧௦ ൅ ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎௜௡௣௨௧௦ ൅ ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎ ൅ ܲܨܪ஽஼௉௎௢௨௧௣௨௧௦ ൅ ܲܨܪ஽௢௨௧௣௨௧௦  (4) 
 
For the values of the inputs and outputs, we will use the data from the part describing the safety module, where 
the value PFHDinputs = 1.5·10-7 represents the safety electromechanical switch and 1.2·10-8 relates to the redundant 
safety contactors. The distributed safety inputs (Allen Bradley – 1734-IB8S) exhibit PFHDCPUinputs = 5.1·10-10, and 
the distributed safety outputs (Allen Bradley 1734-OB8S) are expressed as PFHDCPUoutputs = 5.14·10-10. The safety 
CPU (Allen Bradley 1756-L71S) then has PFHDCPU = 1.2·10-9. We can thus see that the overall PFHDSafetyPLC equals 
1.63224·10-7. 
 In view of the preceding facts, it is possible to claim that using the safety PLC is more reliable than applying the 
safety module. To substantiate this statement, we can introduce the following description:  
The EtherNet/IP with the CIP Safety protocol is certified up to the SIL3, which represents the values of 
PFHD = 10-8 and lower. Thanks to the CRC and the other measures specified above, the probability of residual errors 
in the network oscillates between the values 10-19 and 10-20. In this context, the PFHD value will then be 
approximately 9·10-13, this being a number we can neglect in calculations even for the SIL3. 
5.3. Comparison of simple architectures 
In the chapters above, we made simple calculations of an architecture based on safety modules and a safety PLC 
with distributed inputs and outputs. When considering only the PFHD value, we can highlight the safety PLC as a 
slightly better solution. 
5.4. Advantages of safety modules 
In the safety domain, the time response exhibits a critical value. The typical response time of safety modules is 
approximately 10 ms. Compared to this, the safety PLC displays a significantly higher value because a simple safety 
program exhibits a scan time of about 25 ms; however, we also have to account for the reaction time of the inputs, 
(which equals 16.2 ms in our case) and the reaction time of the outputs (6.2 ms). The last value relates to the 
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Ethernet network. We have thus described a simple solution with no Ethernet switch or devices such as drives or the 
HMI; even though the expectable latency of the network oscillates around 3 ms, this value is subject to further 
growth proportional to the traffic increase within the network. The reaction time of the proposed simple solution 
reaches approximately 50 ms, and this is still a very low number. Controlling fast actions, such as those performed 
by the clutch-brake valve on an eccentric press, requires a very long time; therefore, the period necessary for fast 
action control is up to 5 ms. 
5.5. Advantages of safety PLCs. 
Connecting more safety modules together is not a difficult task when the logical function AND is available 
between the particular modules and the safe state of the machine. With a more complex function for the safety 
modules (OR) and wherever more demanding logical linkage between such modules is needed, the number of output 
contacts begins to grow dramatically. As this number expands, the PFHD increases as well. However, the count of 
contacts may become so high that, for the same safety function with the same hardware but more contacts at the 
output side, degradation of the PFHD will occur (such as the demotion from the SIL2 to the SIL1). Furthermore, we 
have to consider that the response times can grow too. With the safety PLC, the situation is nevertheless very 
simple: all the safety inputs and outputs are wired, and the logical function will be defined in the control safety 
software. There will remain the same PFHD, and the time response increase will be neglectable. 
Conclusion 
This paper describes the Common Industrial Protocol, a technique used in many types of networks, including 
EtherNet/IP or DeviceNet. The Common Industrial Protocol Safety is presented in detail with a particular focus on 
its principles and applications, and a simple example of the safety problem is analyzed. The proposed solutions 
comprise the classical wired approach and the method employing CIP Safety integrated in Ethernet/IP. The result 
obtained from the comparison of both solutions is as follows: The differences in the base safety function between 
the solutions remain very small (if we compare PFHDSafetyRelay = 1.682·10-7 and PFHDSafetyPLC = 1.63224·10-7, we 
obtain the difference of only 4.98·10-9), but the procedure using CIP Safety brings more additional features, for 
example the advantage of safety module diagnostics. The situation nevertheless changes if we need to apply 
complex functions (such as OR). The classical solution requires more safety input/output contacts, and the 
parameter PFHD increases more than with Safety PLCs. 
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